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4'\., X o. 23646. In Bank. 
PACIFIC SOU'rHWES'r DEYELOP:rviEN'!.' CORPORA-
'l'ION , v WESTERN P A-
CLB'IC HAU_,RQAD COMPANY ), Re-
[1] Frauds, Statute of-Agreements Relating to Real Property-
Interests Affected.-The term "real estate" used in the 
statute of frauds Code, * subd. 5, Code Civ. Proc., 
~ 1973, subd. 5) conforms with the eommon-law detlnition of 
real property as induding only a freehold interest in land, 
mul excludes estates for years or lesser duration. 
[2J Brokers-Employment--Written Authorization.--In determin-
ing the nature of services which will employment 
eontract within the statute of the "to sell or 
purchase" includes "to aid or assist in the or sale" 
of real estate; sueh broad construetion of the term conforms 
with a primary purpose of the statute, the of real 
estate owners from assertion of false claims 
agents. 
[3] !d.-Employment--Written Authorization.--The procurement 
of an option agreement for the purchase of real property is a 
contract that aid~ or a~sist in the or sale of real 
property, and properly emnes within the statute of frauds. 
[4] !d.-Employment--Written Authorization.~--A contract em~ 
ploying a broker to obtain au option for the of real 
property tomes within the statute of fraud.~ and must be in 
writing. 
[5] !d.-Employment-Written Authorization.--The chief element 
required to he shown in writing with respect to a broker's 
authority to buy or sell realty is the fact of his employment 
to act for the principal in the transaction. 
[6] !d.-Employment--Written Authorization.- A letter from a 
prospective buyer's to a broker's employee 
merely stating the tm.·ms and c·onditions on which such buyer 
wns willing to for the hut not showing 
the broker's empl oynJPnt to ad for and indicating 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Statute of, fl4 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Statute of § 14H et seq. 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Brohr~, ~ :Jii et 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: 
Broken;, ~ lH; 
Brokers, § 22 







Cod<', ~ Ui:24; 
lL B. Co. 68 
Id.~Employment-~Written Authorization.---The memorandum 
the statute of frauds to real estate brokers' 
will 
I d.--Employment--Written Authorization.-A 
the his 
to recover a real estate enmmis~ion. 




!91 !d.-Employment-Written Authorization.-When a law has 
heen enaeted for the purpose of protection against assertion 
of unfounded elaims, Rneh }lS those by brokers or ag£mts, it 
should he so ronstrued a~ to pffect the object of the enact-
ment. 
110] !d.-Employment--Estoppel to Assert Statute.-A buyer of 
realty sw~d n broker for allegerl serviees in eonnection with 
proeun•nH•nt of an option to purchase is not estopped to plead 
the statute or frauds reason of the faet that the buyer's 
representativf' fln[lll,IT eonelud•:d an ornl option agreement with 
the owner for purehasP of the property and the sale was sub-
sequently where the fact that the broker ren-
dered serviees and conducted unsuccessful negotiations with 
the owner dors not eonstitute n change of position to the 
broker's detriment, and where the fact that the buyer refused 
to pay the hrok<:r n commission on an option whieh the buyer 
lntPl' procured throug-h direct negotiations with the owner does 
not constitute an nnjnst (mriehnwnt within the meaning of the 
estoppel doctrine. 
[11] !d.-Employment--Written Authori.zation.~-A licensed real 
estate broker to know that contracts for real 
estate eom:ni~sions are inYali<i ~md unenforceable unle'ls put in 
writing and Rubscribed bv tllf~ prrson to he ehargNI. ( Civ. 
Code, ~ J 624, suhd. 5; Code Civ. Proe., § 197:1, subil. fl.) 
APPEAL from a jmlgmrni of tlle Snperior Court of I1os 
Angeles Connty. Clanm(·e NI. Hanson, .Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to reeover ~?ompeHsation for services rendered in 
eonneetion with proeuring an option to purchase real prop-
Prty .• Judgment for (lefenilant affirmed. 
Gregory M. Crentz for Appellant. 
Smith, Van Dyke & Hihlretb, H. Allen Smith and Jack E. 
Hildreth for Rei'lpondent. 
64 PAc. ETc. DEv. CoRP. v. WESTERN PAc. R. R. Co. C.2d 
In 
its right to 
tween the which was in 
outset of the trial, the court deelared its 
could not recover because the pleaded was not 
in writing as required by the statute of frauds. Plaintiff 
thereupon made an offer of proof, and it was stipulated 
that the documents pleaded in the amended complaint were 
deemed to have been offered in evidenee, that an objection 
was made thereto and sustained by the court. Judgment 
was then entered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. 
As grounds for reversal, plaintiff contends: (1) that the 
pleaded agreement does not come within the statute of 
frauds; but (2) if the statute does apply, there was a 
sufficient writing as required; and ( 3) in any event de-
fendant is estopped to rely on the statute as a defense. Our 
review of the record, in the light of the authorities hereinafter 
cited, leads to the conclusion that plaintiff's contentions 
cannot be sustained. 
The substance of plaintiff's offer of proof is as follows: 
Cliff A. Nelson, then an employee of the Fortune Realty 
Company of San Jose, conducted certain negotiations with 
defendant's representative, F. B. Stratton, for the purchase 
of the property in question. Various propositions, offers, and 
C:,Ounteroffers were discussed by the parties relating to the 
purchase but no definite arrangements were concluded as to 
the price to be paid, or concerning any employment of Nelson 
individually, or of Fortune Realty Company to represent 
defendant. \Vhile negotiations were still pending and on 
August 15, 1950, Nelson became an employee of plaintiff and 
remained in such employ until December 15, 1950. Mean-
while Nelson and Stratton continued to correspond. On 
August 29, Stratton wrote to Nelson suggesting a price of 
$3,000 per acre and $1,500 for an option. Nelson responded 
by letter of August 31, advising Stratton that a meeting 
should be arranged and proposing a 5 per cent commission 
as defendant's broker. 
On September 6, 1950, Stratton met Nelson and plaintiff's 
president Creutz in Los Angeles. At that time Creutz ex-
amined a proposed option agreement submitted by Stratton, 
Lenfest ' and with the 
of the above amount, or 
. Nelson." This reference to ' 
relate(l to the 







those commission of per cent of 
purchase 
Fortune Healty 
after Nelson had left the 
the time that Stratton bad 
or 
c;erYices to defendant. 
Plaintiff c:ontcnds that 
this 
between Nelson and 
was written 
and long 
obtained the from 
claims that 5 per cent 





subd. 5 ; Code Civ. thereof he in 
§ 1 snbrL :),) 
settled 
Jn support of its plaintiff 
relies on tlwse : that an option to purchase 
47 C.2d-3 
66 PAc. ETC. DI<JV. CoRP. C.2d 
real an irrevocable and 
continuing offer to sell at a within a specified 
time; that it conveys no interest in land to the optionee but 
yests in him a right in personam to at his election; 
and that such agreement relating to the sale of land is "by no 
means a sale of property, but is a sale of a right to purchase.'' 
(Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 31 CaL2d 766, 772 
[192 P.2d 949, 3 A.L.R.2d 691]; Hicks v. Christeson, 174 
CaL 712, 716 [164 P. 395] ; TransameTica Corp. v. Par·r1:ngton, 
]15 CaLApp.2d 346, 851-353 [252 P.2d 385] ; see, also, Il.ritt 
v. Athens Hills Dev. Co., 109 CaLApp.2d 642, 646 [241 P.2d 
606]; Seeburg v. El Royale Corp., 54 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [128 
P.2d 362] .) However, the cases upon which plaintiff relies 
were not concerned with the application of the statute of 
frauds but only with the distinction between the ''option 
contract" and the "contract to which the irrevocable offer 
of the optionor relates." ( W ar·ne1· Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 
supra.) It therefore does not follow, as plaintiff contends, 
that since an option contract is not itself a contract for the 
purchase or sale of real estate but only evidences the "right" 
to performance of such agreed act, a contract employing a 
broker to obtain the option does not fall within the statute 
of frauds. 
In California an option to purchase real property has 
been held to come within the statute of frauds and so must 
be in writing. (Bovo v. Abrahamson, 100 Cal.App. 373, 383 
[280 P. 191] .) The propriety of this holding was recognized 
in Wilson v. Bailey, 8 Cal.2d 416 [65 P.2d 770], where the 
enforcement of an oral extension of a written option to re-
purchase certain real property was in question. After ob-
serving that ''certain contracts to be enforceable are required 
to be in writing, or that some note or memorandum thereof 
be in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged or his 
agent" (Civ. Code, § 1624; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973), the 
court stated that it is ''equally well settled that the facts of 
a particular case may give rise to an equitable estoppel 
against the party seeking to set up the statute of frauds and 
foreclose such party from relying thereon." ( P. 421.) Upon 
this basis of equitable estoppel, the court held that the fact 
of oral extension of the option would not defeat the optionee's 
rights thereunder. 
Plaintiff cites Howard v. D. W. Hobson Co., 38 Cal.App. 
445 [ 176 P. 715], for the proposition that a broker may re-
cover on an oral contract of employment to procure an option 
PAc. ETc. DEv. CoRP. v. WESTERN PAc. R. R. Co. 67 
[47 C.2d 62; 301 P.2d 825] 
of real But that case concerned 
between two brokers to divide equally a corn-
be paid upon the sale of the land. This court, 
denying the application for a hearing in that case, said 
pages 460-461 : ''. . . we deem it proper to say that we 
not prepared to hold that subdivision 6 of section 1624 
the Civil Code [now subd. 5] is not applicable in the 
of a simple contract between a real estate agent or 
broker and a proposed purchaser to obtain an option for the 
of real estate by the purchaser. 'l'he opinion clearly 
that this was in substance a joint venture on the part 
plaintiff and defendant for the sale of real property of 
third party, and the distribution of the profits between 
them. 'l'he District Court of Appeal was clearly right in con-
that subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil Code 
subd. 5] does not extend to agreements between brokers 
cooperate in making sales for the sake of the commission 
profits and that this substantially was such a case.'' 
[1] The term "real estate" as used in our statute of 
frauds ( Civ. Code, § 1624, subcl. 5; Code Ci v. Proc., § 1973, 
subd. 5) conforms with the common law definition of real 
property as including only a freehold interest in land, and 
excludes estates for years or lesser duration. (Dabney v. 
Rdwm·ds, 5 Cal.2d 1, 6-7 [53 P.2d 962, 103 A.L.R. 822] .) 
Therefore, it has been held that while a contract employing 
a broker to purchase or sell real estate comes within the statute 
of frauds (Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corp., 33 Cal.2d 
819 [205 P.2d 1025] ), a contract employing a broker 
sell oil and gas leases running only for a fixed term of 
years does not, because the latter employment relates to 
''chattels real,'' a species of personal property as distinguished 
l'rom "real estate" or "real property." (Dabney v. Edwards, 
supra.) 
[2] In determining the nature of the services which will 
bring an employment contract within the statute, the phrase 
"to sell or purcl1ase" includes "to aid or assist in the pur-
chase or sale" of real estate. ( JI oopcr v. 1lf ayfield, 114 Cal. 
App.2d 802, 806 [251 P.2d 330]; Duckworth v. Schumacher, 
135 Cal.App. G61, 666 f27 P.2d 919] .) Such broad con-
struction of the term conforms with one of the primary pur-
poses of the statute, the protection of real estate owners from 
the assertion of false claims by brokers and agents. (Toomy 
Dunphy, 86 Cal. 639, 642 [25 P. 130] ; also Gorham v. 







to he shown in writing is 
the broker to aet for the prineipal 
CaLJur.2d § p. 185; Toomy v. 
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char·d v. 
mnount as a com-






rnust therefore wr1 hrre are in-
suf-ficient under the statnte frauds to snsiain plaintiff's 
claim. [9] As was said rrgarding this statute in Egan v. 
Pacific Southwest Trttst & Sav. Bank, supra, 92 Cal.App. 1, 
70 PAo. ETc. DEv. CoRP. WEsTERN PAc. R H. Co. [47 C.2d 
at page 5: "When a law has been enacted irJr the purpose of 
protection against the assertion of unfound<'d it should 
be so construed as to effect the of the (mad.ment." 
[10] Nor is there any merit to contention that 
defendant is estopped to plead the statute of frauds h.v reason 
of the fact that Stratton, on behalf of finally con-
cluded an option agreement with Lenfest for pun·Jmse of 
the property and the sale was subsequently ccnsummated. 'rhis 
is not a case of unconscionable injury to plaintiff brcause 
of a change of position in reliance upon the alleged contract 
of employment (LeBlond v. Wolfe, 83 Cal.App.2d 282 [188 
P.2d 278]) or an unjust enrichment of defendant through 
acceptance of the benefits of the alleged contract without 
itself being obligated thereunder. (1llonarco v. Lo Gr·eco, 35 
Cal.2d 621 [220 P .2d 737].) The fact that plaintiff rendered 
services and conducted unsuccessful negotiations with IJenfest 
does not constitute a change of position to plaintiff's detri-
ment, nor does the fact that defendant refused to pay plaintiff 
a real estate commission upon an option which defendant 
later procured through direct negotiations ·with I1enfest con-
stitute an unjust enrichment within the meaning of the 
estoppel doctrine. To hold otherwise, in the absence of any 
showing of fraud, would defeat the purpose of the statute 
of frauds in relation to real estate transactions. (Hicks v. 
Post, 154 Cal. 22. 28 r96 P. 878] ; Augustine v. Trueco, 124 
Cal.App.2d 229, 241-244 [268 P.2d 780]; Hoop('r· v. Mayfield, 
supr·a, 114 Cal.App.2d 802, 809; Colbnrn v. 8essin, supra, 
94 CaLApp.2d 4, 6.) 
[11] Plaintiff is a licensed real estate broker and, as such, 
is presumed to know that contracts for real estate commissions 
are invalid and unenforceable unless put in writing and sub-
scribed by the person to be charged. ( Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 
5; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973, subd. 5; Steiner v. Rowley, supra, 
35 Cal.2d 713,717; Marks v. Walter 0. JJ1cCady Cm·p., supra, 
33 Cal.2d 814, 819.) Nevertheless, plaintiff failed to secure 
proper written authorization to protect itself in the trans-
action. Rather it assumed the risk of relying upon claimed 
oral promises of defendant, and it has no cause for complaint 
if its efforts go unrewarded. (Augustine v. Tnwco, supra, 
124 Cal.App.2d 229, 241.) 
In conclusion, it should be said that this case clearly illus-
trates the desirability of requiring a written memorandum 
of a contract employing any person as a broker in a trans-
action of the type involved. Prior to the time that Stratton 
1956] PAc. ETc. DEv. CoRP. v. WESTERN PAc. R. R. Co. 71 
[47 C.2d 62; 301 P.2d 825] 
directly from Lenfest at the price of 
per acre, there was no memorandum signed by Stratton 
which unequivocally evidenced the employment, as defendant's 
of Nelson individually or Fortune Realty Company, 
which was Nelson's former employer, or plaintiff, which was 
subsequent employer. A reference to employment 
and compensation was contained in the above-mentioned letter 
Nelson to Stratton dated August 31, 1950, which sug-
that a 5 per cent commission be paid by defendant, 
but this was on the basis of securing an option from Lenfest, 
seller, at the price of $2,500 per acre and subject to nego-
tiations concerning certain further conditions. Prior to that 
the correspondence between Nelson and Stratton is 
entirely consistent with the idea that Nelson or his employer 
should look to the owner of the property for any compensation 
which might be anticipated. Not only did Stratton never 
agree in writing to Nelson's suggestion of August 31, con-
eerning employment or commission but furthermore, no option 
to purchase at $2,500 per acre was ever obtained. After 
Lenfest refused to grant an option at that price and on satis-
faetory conditions, Stratton and Lenfest negotiated directly, 
and without the aid of any broker, upon the final terms of an 
option at $2,750 per acre. In this situation, and without any 
showing in the reeord that there was any binding obligation 
on the part of defendant to pay a broker's commission to any-
one, defendant finally agreed to, and did pay to, Fortune 
Company and Nelson the sum of $5,112.94 for their 
services. There is therefore no legal or equitable basis shown 
to sustain plaintiff's action against defendant for its claimed 
compensation in said transaction. 
'l'he judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent for the reasons set forth by Mr . 
. Justice Fourt in the opinion prepared by him for the District 
Court of Appeal in (Cal.App.) 293 P.2d 800. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-! agree with Justice McComb 
that the judgment should be reversed but I prefer to place 
the reversal on another ground. 
Regardless of whether an agreement employing a real 
Pstate broker, for a commission, to seeure an option to pnrehase 




told you we would pay 
Fortune with the understand-
subscribed Stratton 
of his office ·with 
Commissioner,'' apprars on its face 
plaintiff 
demurrer. 
of the agreemcn t meets t be 
Standart 7), 174 CaL 
.Tur.2d 
In this connection 




and an obligation 
a real estate 
by the 
Tfalsh v. 
; 23 CaL 
that Nelson 
tl1at " my new con-
Industrial Department 
... Have 
may appear to be due 
up to the date of my 
""'"-"'"''""' my salesman's license dovm 
Co." 
In the light of the circumstances shown 
a question of mixed law and fact arises. 
missible to construe defendant's aC!mission of 
broker or agent, and admission of for a 
running· in favor of plaintiff~ It seems to me that we 
should not hold on demurrer the evidence as well as the 
that a construction in favor of could not 
supported. 
For the reasons above stated I would '~'C"""''"o 
CA.RTER, J.-I dissent. 
I agree with Mr. Justice McComb that an to 
obtain an option to buy real property does not come within an 
employing an agent "to or sell real 
estate" within the statute of frauds inasmuch as it is nothing 
than employing an agent to obtain 
chose in action. ( Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 5.) In addition 
the discussion in the able and learned 
Mr. Justice Fourt for the District Court of 
) 293 P.2d 800 adopted Mr. Justice 
should be mentioned that real property is defined as 
tenements and hereditaments (Code Civ. 
and personal property includes chattels and ' 
action" (id., § 17, subd. . Hence 
action is personal, not real, 




25 Cal.App.2d 325 [77 P.2d 306]) and that is true with refer-
ence to the statute of frauds ( Civ. § subd. 5), 
74 
here involved. 
962, 103 A.L.R. 






should be read into the 
I also agree with Mr. ,Justice Schauer in his that, 
assuming a writing is neeessary the case should be tried to see 
if there is a sufficient memorandum here. The memorandum 
pleaded appears to be sufficient. 
I further believe, that on the third ground urged 
by plaintiff, estoppel, the defendant could not rely on the 
statute of frauds. In 1vlonarco v. La 35 Cal.2d 621 
[220 P.2d 737], this court clarified the law in relation to 
estoppel to plead the statute of frauds. This court stated two 
fundamental principles: (1) Estoppel to rely on the statute 
of frauds may exist where injury would result when the party 
has changed his position in reliance on the oral contract, or 
(2) unjust enrichment would result to the other person if 
he were permitted to assert the statute successfully. The 
question then is only, was the injury which resulted from 
plaintiff's change of position, and the resulting unjust enrich-
ment of defendant, sufficient. In the Monarco case the sup-
plying of services to the parents for many years in reliance on 
the oral contract was held enough under both principles. In 
the instant case plaintiff had rendered valuable services to de-
fendant to obtain an option on the ]and in reliance on the oral 
contract and hence was injured. Defendant was unjustly en-
riched by the acceptance of those services (he obtained the 
option) for which he refused to pay. Suppose plaintiff had 
devoted all of his time to the project for five years, would 
there be any doubt that there was both injury and unjust 
enrichment? In Ruincllo v. Murray, 36 CaL2d 687 [227 P.2d 
251], this court held there was no injury because the employee 
was paid for his services bnt clearly intimated he could re-
cover the reasonable value thereof to the extent it was above 
what he was actually paid. There can be no doubt, therefore, 
that plaintiff here should be entitled to recover the reasonable 
value of his services even though the contract vYas oral. Some 
of the cases cited in the majority opinion for the proposition 
that there cannot be estoppel as to real estate brokers' con-
tracts were before the decision in the .M:onarco case (see 
Hicks v. Post, 154 Cal. 22 [96 P. 878]; Colburn v. Sessin, 
Oct. 5, 
October 
were of the 
Petitioner, v* ALICE DAVIS, as 
; EDWARD J. et 
in Interest. 
Counties~Charters.--County charter adopted pur-
suant to constitutional authorization are not limited by the 
law which otherwise apply. 
[2a, 2b] Elections-Nominations-Names Which Go on Ballot at 
Final Election.-Under charter provisions declaring 
that "~Whenever a vacaney shall occur in an elective office in 
this County other than a member of the Board of Supervisors 
the Board shall fill such vacancy . . . until the election 
and of his successor" and that "In case of any 
such there shall be elected at the next general elec-
to fill sueh vaeaney for the unexpired term, un-
term ends on the first Monday after the 
next succeeding the election, in which 
case the election he for the unexpired term and for an 
entire new term in addition," the unexpired term of a district 
attorney who was elected in November, 1954, for a term which 
is to in 1959, and who resigned from such 
offier on June lJ, to be filled by election at the first 
general election which oceurs following the vacancy, for which 
election candidates could qualify under any method prescribed 
by and the fact that the vacancy did not occur until 
after the election of ,June 5, 1956, is immaterial. 
[3] !d.-Construction of Statutes.--The language of an election 
law cmmot be altered of its effect, 
uor ean the of by failure 
See Cal.Jur.2d, § 26 et seq. 
See Cal.Jur.2d, 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Counties, § 4; [2, 4] Elections, § 41; 
Elections, § 8; Elections, § 8. 
